Iran's Missile Propaganda Malfunction
Drudge Report- Iran fakes missile test footage
Does it concern you that some people in Washington believe the United States should negotiate without preconditions with this regime?
Well, at least negotiations might give Iran a little more time to practice using Photoshop. (Or develop nuclear weapons.)
I wonder which one we should be more concerned about.
Well, at least negotiations might give Iran a little more time to practice using Photoshop. (Or develop nuclear weapons.)
I wonder which one we should be more concerned about.
1 comment:
I think we should more concerned about acquainting ourselves with the realities of Iran's foreign policy initiatives, and intelligently determining our most reasonable course of action.
Prior to the 1979 revolution in Iran, in which the Shah was overthrown and the Ayatollah Khomeini came to power, the United states was a strategic ally of Iran; the US and Iran shared close economic and military ties. The US also sold light-water nuclear reactors to Iran in the 1950s as part of the “Atoms for Peace” plan instituted by Eisenhower. But obviously, that relationship changed dramatically in 1979 with the overthrow of the Shah.
There are three distinct phases in Iran’s contemporary foreign policy. The first began in 1979 with the Ayatollah Khomeini and the emergence of Iran as an Islamic theocracy. This phase adhered to the slogan “Neither West nor East but only the Islamic Republic,” which was actually incorporated into the Constitution of December 1979.
Khomeini sought to expand Islamic Iran without territorial bounds, to come to the aid of the world’s oppressed, and to “uproot” the three evils of Zionism, communism and capitalism. Most of all, the first phase saw the emergence of staunch anti-American views in Iran, demonstrated by riots, protests and the November 1979 hostage situation.
The foreign policy of this period was dramatically different than it had been just prior to the 1979 Revolution: Iran’s close relationship with the US turned very sour, Iran began to support militant Islamic groups, and Iran’s pro-West position turned into a pro-Islamic one. The resulting sanctions and shifting alliances greatly impacted Iran both immediately in the Iran/Iraq war, and in the decades to follow.
The second phase, between 1989 and 1997, marked the post-war reconstruction efforts under President Hashemi Rafsanjani. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait provided an open door for Iran to re-establish diplomatic ties with countries such as Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia among others, as Iraq had now replaced Iran as the immediate threat to security in the region. The invasion also created an opportunity for Iran to improve its ties with Europe.
Economically, Iran’s prospects were less than promising. President Rafsanjani introduced the First Five Year Economic Plan in 1989, attempting to stimulate economic growth. But despite all its efforts, by 1991 Iran’s economy had only reached its 1977 GDP. With population growth factored in, Iran’s per-capita income was down by 50%.
Iran’s relations with the US also suffered. While the Clinton administration remained open to diplomatic engagement with Iran, the US refused to end sanctions without Iran’s agreement to end its pursuit of WMD, support of terrorism, and open opposition to Israel.
The US also blocked Iran’s access to international financial institutions, and put pressure on Europe, Russia and others to sever ties with Iran.
The third phase began in 1997 and is associated with former president Khatami and his political and socio-economic reform efforts. Many young people and particularly young women were extremely unhappy with the political and economic situation in Iran as the presidential election in 1997 grew near.
Since Rafsanjani could not run for a third term, and the Council of Guardians felt the popular pressure for change from below, one of three candidates they approved was Mohammad Khatami, a former minister of Rafsanjani’s cabinet (first term) who had resigned due to Rafsanjani’s restrictive cultural policies.
Khatami won just under 70 percent of the popular vote in his first run for president, and an even greater majority in his second four years later.
Needless to say, Iran’s relations with the EU, already improved during the Rafsanjani administration, improved substantially under Khatami.
This visible reform in Iran is less a result of popular democracy and EU support than it is the non-elected elite’s decision to withdraw their control over the political, economic and socio-political arenas.
While many among the EU argue that increased engagement with Iran could only direct Iran down the path of further reform, particularly on issues such as the Israel/Palestinian conflict, WMD and support of terrorists; this thriving reform could well be in great danger given the Bush administration’s passion for regime change and its clear targeting of Iran as a rogue state.
What Iran needs more than anything right now is something to lose. We've backed it into a corner and given it few options. We should leave Iran an honorable path of retreat. Engaging Iran in the global economy is the only approach that has merit.
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